secret messages as you're typing them. For the purpose of recording, he might
as well use a hardware keylogger installed between keyboard and machine. Or
simply a hidden camera pointed towards your screen. Or even a TEMPEST
device, hoping that you still use a CRT screen.
Once he gets his hands on the contents of your computer, either physically or
from a remote location over the network, he may search for any plaintext
remnants in nonvolatile storage devices or RAM.
From where did you get your copy of GnuPG and Enigmail? You should only
trust software downloaded from the official web sites. Copies obtained from
other sources might have been tampered with, and as such contain viruses,
backdoors or trojans.
Finally, an attacker might persuade, force, or delude you (e.g. by impersonation)
to surrender your passphrase, your secret key, or your messages. And all these
attacks can be carried over your correspondents, too. The possibilities are
endless.
12.2.1. Basic protection
You must follow these golden rules in order to keep your machine reasonably
safe:
• Don't install, run, or open software of dubious origin (e.g. warez found on
peer-to-peer networks, or programs hosted on untrusted web sites). This
includes suspicious email attachments and macros on word processing
programs.
• Use an antivirus software, updated daily. Make frequent scans of your
machine and external hard drives.
• Use one or more antimalware programs.
• Filter network traffic with a personal firewall and deny all unknown
connections.
• Install OS vendor patches. Keep all your software up-to-date, and keep
yourself informed of the latest vulnerabilities.
• Use a screen lock when you are not physically in front of your computer
and there are strangers around.
• Use strong passwords. Don't write them down in easy-to-find places.
• If you use a Wi-Fi connection, enable WPA on your access point.
12.2.2. Increased protection
If your communications involve critically sensitive information, you should not
leave your computer physically accessible at all – even when turned off. If
stolen, the thief would have access to all your files, including your secret key.
The private key will still be protected by the passphrase but, by performing
analysis and forensics on the filesystem, the thief will have access to a lot of
plaintext data (temporary files, memory swap files, and such) that could include
information you thought was encrypted. Windows leaves a lot of data around,
and other OSes aren't much better with respect to this.
You might consider using whole-disk encryption at this point. Section 12.3.2.
mentions some disk encryption software for additional protection of your key
pair; most of this software can also be used to encrypt the whole OS.
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